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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 001856

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FOR EUR/WE, EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017 TAGS: <u>PREL EUN PO UN ZL</u>

SUBJECT: PORTUGAL - MOVING TOWARDS EU CONSENSUS ON KOSOVO

Classified By: DEP POL/ECON COUNSELOR CARI ENAV FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

Summary

11. (C) FM Luis Amado told A/S Daniel Fried on July 13 that the issue of Kosovo's independence was the most pressing near-term issue of Portugal's EU Presidency, aside from EU treaty reform. The two compared notes from their recent trips to the Balkans, confirming the challenges and next steps the United States and the EU will face in the event of Russian blockage of a Kosovo UNSCR. Amado acknowledged the need for the United States and the EU to work together on a "Plan C" (Kosovo independence without a UNSCR) and noted that his Political Director Bramao Ramos was working diligently to bring all 27 member states to consensus to support Kosovo independence. To be able to apply maximum pressure on the few dissenting member states, Amado said he needed to exhaust every avenue with Russia. He suggested that Contact Group Foreign Ministers hold a meeting in Moscow within the next 120 days should negotiations with Russia prove unproductive and asked Fried to relay this request to Secretary Rice.

Context/Participants

12. (SBU) A/S Daniel Fried called on FM Amado in Lisbon on July 13 following a full day of meetings with the EU-27 political directors and the EU Troika political directors, plus discussions with Portugal's Secretary of State for Defense (reported septel) and the Prime Minister,s Senior Diplomatic Advisor. Kosovo was at the center of every discussion. FM Amado was accompanied by PolDir Vasco Bramao Ramos, Chief of Staff Francisco Ribeiro Menezes, and Diplomatic Advisor Paulo Lourenco. Fried was accompanied by Charge Adrienne O, Neal and Dep P/E Counselor Cari Enav.

Dealing with Russia and Beyond

13. (C) Both A/S Fried and FM Amado had just returned from separate trips to the Balkans. Leaders in Belgrade and Pristina reiterated their well known positions (septel), with Belgrade refusing to accept Kosovo independence and Pristina growing ever anxious at the delay in implementing the Ahtisaari plan. Amado acknowledged the West would not be able to ask the Kosovars to wait much longer after the agreed upon 120 days, so it was critical that the West engage Russia at every possible level during this timeframe. Fried assured Amado that the United States would explore every opportunity to bring the Russians on board. However, in the likely event that Russia would not agree to the current UNSC draft, the

United States and the EU would have to decide whether to pull the text or force a veto. In any event, Fried stressed, we would have to move forward together toward Kosovo's supervised independence.

Developing a Plan C

- 14. (C) Amado underscored the need for a coordinated U.S.-EU approach to address Kosovo independence in response to a Russian veto (Plan C) -- the same point Fried had been urging throughout the day in his meetings with EU interlocutors. Amado commented that "if Russia is on board, that's not bad. If the EU and the U.S. are united but without Russia, that's also not bad, but if we (the U.S. and Europe) are divided, that's very bad." Fried noted that on this basis the U.S. would work with Europe on Kosovo independence. (Note: In a separate meeting, the PM's Senior Diplomatic Advisor Jorge Roza de Oliveira agreed that moving forward was the only realistic way to avoid chaos and bloodshed in Kosovo. He was relieved to know the U.S. would continue to coordinate with the EU post-UNSCR.)
- 15. (C) Amado noted that PolDir Bramao Ramos was working diligently with other member states to develop consensus within the EU on moving forward without Russian concurrence. Bramao Ramos was taking a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, he was trying to establish a legal basis for the ESDP Mission. On the other hand, he was endorsing the concept that EU unity would not require all member states to recognize Kosovo's independence at the same time. Timing would be a foreign policy decision for each member state to determine.

Looking for "Legitimacy"

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16. (C) Amado reiterated his concern that there was not much time left to secure a satisfactory outcome in Kosovo. The EU understands the need for unity, but there are still a few problematic member states (Greece and Spain in particular) that would only move forward under the framework of a UNSCR. To establish "legitimacy" to confront these partners and force consensus, Amado insisted he needed to exhaust every avenue with the Russians. He suggested that the Contact Group hold a meeting in Moscow at the FM level within the next 120 days should negotiations with Russia prove unproductive. He asked Fried to relay this request to Secretary Rice and noted that he would not mention this

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proposal to any other member state until he had spoken with the Secretary about it.

Comment

¶7. (C) Amado expressed commitment to Kosovo's independence, and we were encouraged to hear him say that he is working to achieve that outcome in the event of a Russian blockage at the UNSC. As the EU pulls itself together towards consensus in the face of Russian intransigence, Amado is looking for "legitimacy" to pressure the few member-states yet to acknowledge the inevitability of Kosovo's independence. By seeking a Contact Group meeting in Moscow, he is also looking for cover to fend off criticism by Russia and others that the international community did not do everything possible to address Russian concerns. PM Kostunica arrives in Lisbon on July 16 to discuss developments further.